IN THE POST-TRUTH ERA: MIND MAPPING VALUES OF UKRAINE’S VOLODYMYR ZELENSKY

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ABSTRACT:
The study is focused upon the public figure of Volodymyr Zelensky, a former comedian and media person, who burst into politics in 2019 to win the Presidential Election and to become the sixth President of Ukraine. In this article, intent analysis of Volodymyr Zelensky’s key public speeches allows looking through the speech patterns, action words, metaphors, and other stylistic and rhetorical devices to recognise the speaker’s communicative intentions. To visualise the correlation between the intentions and the values communicated by the President of Ukraine on various occasions, a mind map of his cognitive, emotional, and behavioural communicative intentions was constructed. To assess the adequacy of social reactions to Zelensky’s communicative intentions, a discourse analysis comprising global journalists, analysts and media critique commentaries upon his public speeches was performed. The results of the study shows that although media mostly criticise and assess Zelensky’s political messages as populist, the values he transmits though his official communication to the public tend to reflect the European vector set by Ukraine as a dominant after the 2014 Revolution of Dignity.

KEY WORDS:
discourse analysis, intention, intent-analysis, mind map, political communication, president, Ukraine, values, Volodymyr Zelensky

1 Introduction
Volodymyr Zelensky, the actor and the co-founder of the entertainment production company Studio Kvartal 95 (in English District 95, named after one of the municipal areas in his native Kryvyi Rih city), unexpectedly burst into the Ukrainian political discourse in the midst of the New Year 2019 celebrations by announcing his decision to run for the upcoming presidency on a 1+1 national TV channel owned by Ukraine’s notorious oligarch Ihor Kolomoisky. Kolomoisky’s strong connection to ‘Zelensky’s political phenomenon’
has been proved more than once by numerous investigative journalists, independent experts and public sector activists (e.g., Bihs,5 Solomny,G 3 Tkach5; however, the oligarch’s personal role in Zelensky’s rise to power is yet to be determined.)

To promote the young and inexperienced political candidate, Zelensky’s team made use of the overwhelmingly popular TV series *The Servant of the People* – one of Studio Kvartal 95’s most successful projects featuring Zelensky as Vasyl Holoborodko, a man of the people eventually elected President of the State. The populist vibes around Zelensky’s character (strongly identified in the mass consciousness with the candidate himself) seemed to fit the audience’s expectations so perfectly that his team decidedly played this card time and again, starting with Zelensky’s political party *Servant of the People* (est. 2017) branding and ending with visual designs and slogans used for his presidential campaign. This strategically brilliant decision was accompanied by a real media blitz aimed at social media, featuring multiple innovative approaches and creative solutions aimed at mobilising the mostly reluctant and indifferent Ukrainian electorate almost in no time. Thus, the context around Zelensky’s political phenomenon is shaped both by his close ties with Ukrainian oligarchs and immensely successful media image built up and promoted by *The Servant of the People* TV series. However, this carefully designed picture of a sincere and open everyman contrasts strikingly with the ways Zelensky displays actual reluctance to directly engage with the public and media. In this study we will focus upon the few public speeches he has delivered in an attempt to reconstruct the set of values and intents the sixth President of Ukraine is striving to communicate.

2 The Mystery of Zelensky: Comedy and Political Views

From the very beginning of his presidential campaign, Volodymyr Zelensky deliberately avoided any opportunity to publicly express his political views in person. Instead of traditional political talk, he and his team communicated their ideology through a series of short, self-style videos circulating predominantly on Instagram and Facebook and staffed with populist slogans and oversimplified demagogic statements aptly characterised as “for all the good and against all the bad.”

Upon taking office, Volodymyr Zelensky still avoids open political talks and seems to be reluctant to directly express his views upon the most troublesome issues on Ukraine’s political agenda, thus raising concerns among public activists, journalists, and the active part of Ukraine’s civil society. A series of scandalous and overtly ambiguous statements made by Zelensky’s Office over the Russian invasion and other sensitive political matters resulted in the media doubting both the President’s pro-Ukrainian position and the existence of any overtly ambiguous statements made by Zelensky’s Office over the Russian invasion and other sensitive political matters.

The Servant of the People

Released on 8 July 2019.

Communication Today

Research Studies

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Largely due to his successful career in entertainment, Volodymyr Zelensky’s image as represented in the world press is mostly doubtful. Branded “a comedian” (a neutral professional affiliation mark) in the Western
Informal communication seems to be one of the key markers decidedly used by Zelensky to strengthen his image as a 'new face' in Ukraine's politics. Following the growing demand for the grassroots initiatives and aiming to turn his media products/brand into his political candidates, the candidate dropped the traditional formats of political advertisement in favour of a set of short creative videos sharply criticizing the preceding political generation. As a result, by March 2019 almost 25% of Ukrainians who had by that time decided on their voting choice, expressed their support for Zelensky, which seemed to be a decent support rate for a novice, with his much more experienced rival Petro Poroshenko scoring 22%.11

This innovative approach, however effective it might seem, has established the 'TV vs reality' trope as one of the most common critical tools applied when assessing Zelensky's actual performance. His attempts at distancing himself from Kolomisky, abolishing parliamentary immunity and establishing the Anti-Corruption Court while simultaneously replacing the key independent political figures (such as the Prosecutor General, the Head of the State Customs Service, Head of the State Tax Service of Ukraine) with loyal media headlines (e.g. BBC, Bloomberg),12 as Turkova suggests, Zelensky’s former occupation would often be derogatorily referred to by the post-Soviet (mostly Russian and Belarus) media as an explanation for his political ambiguity. The reason to mock or even humiliate Ukraine through the personality of the President13 as a ‘new face’,14 in Ukrainian politics, Zelensky has received a lot of attention from European leaders who, while seemingly impressed by his revolutionary election campaign techniques (using comedy shows, TV series and theatrical performances to communicate the candidate’s programme), still expressed concerns about the former actor’s ability to overcome corruption and conduct decisive foreign policy. Despite his obvious success at courting the public, Zelensky’s strategies received mixed feedback from the European media, those of a corrupted dictator wannabe, those of a ‘clown’ and those of a saviour, those of a traitor and those of a ‘real patriot’, etc. This innumerant discrepancy is what makes Zelensky’s rare attempts at communicating his thoughts directly to the public so interesting for the media researchers. In the chapters to follow we will examine the President’s official speeches in terms of how his communicative intentions correlate with the values he transmits to the public and briefly outline the ways Zelensky’s addresses resonate with the media.

3 Literature Review

This study applies a method of intent-analysis as a primary method for empirical research. Known as an "intention analysis" in linguistics, this interdisciplinary method is used to distinguish intentions explicitly or implicitly stated in a text. Though relatively new for Ukrainian mass communication research and media studies, intent-analysis has proved its reliability as a qualitative research method in the fields of political science, sociology, social psychology, socio- and psycholinguistics.

In Ukraine, political speech has become the subject of linguistic research in the early 1990s, immediately after the country got its independence. Although the term “political language” itself is a subject of discussion in the range of scientific disciplines (e.g. sociology, social psychology, socio- and psycholinguistics).22 In Ukraine, political speech has become the subject of linguistic research in the early 1990s, immediately after the country got its independence. Although the term “political language” itself is a subject of discussion in the range of scientific disciplines (e.g. sociology, social psychology, socio- and psycholinguistics). In Ukraine, political speech has become the subject of linguistic research in the early 1990s, immediately after the country got its independence. Although the term “political language” itself is a subject of discussion in the range of scientific disciplines (e.g. sociology, social psychology, socio- and psycholinguistics). In Ukraine, political speech has become the subject of linguistic research in the early 1990s, immediately after the country got its independence. Although the term “political language” itself is a subject of discussion in the range of scientific disciplines (e.g. sociology, social psychology, socio- and psycholinguistics). In Ukraine, political speech has become the subject of linguistic research in the early 1990s, immediately after the country got its independence. Although the term “political language” itself is a subject of discussion in the range of scientific disciplines (e.g. sociology, social psychology, socio- and psycholinguistics). In Ukraine, political speech has become the subject of linguistic research in the early 1990s, immediately after the country got its independence. Although the term “political language” itself is a subject of discussion in the range of scientific disciplines (e.g. sociology, social psychology, socio- and psycholinguistics). In Ukraine, political speech has become the subject of linguistic research in the early 1990s, immediately after the country got its independence. Although the term “political language” itself is a subject of discussion in the range of scientific disciplines (e.g. sociology, social psychology, socio- and psycholinguistics).
One of the most productive methodological approaches merging from these two approaches is critical discourse analysis (CDA) successfully applied by political linguists to scan politicians’ messages for hidden political and ideological subtexts bearing crucial significance for understanding the actual state of power relations. CDA of political texts is most effective in informing and influential characteristics of political communications, their spectrum of genres and respective linguistic tools: ideologemes, mythologemes, metaphorical groups, signs of verbal aggression and cultural and linguistic concepts.

Digging deeper into the scholarly discussion around the term “political language”, one can trace two basic approaches to understanding its linguistic specificity. For the first of them, political language is a special sign system designed to perform political communication, a specific sub-language with its own grammar and lexicon fit to express the authority’s ideology. The second approach finds the specificity of political language’s grammar, terminology or rhetorical devices insignificant, positioning it rather as a functional invariant than a separate sub-language. In modern Ukrainian political science and political linguistics, the predominant understanding of the concept of “political language” is constructed by Nagorna who refers, in particular, to Chudinov’s research on political metaphors in Russian political discourse. Nagorna defines “political language” mainly as a tool used to fight for power and status. The political language’s immanent references to conflict and game have been further investigated by Synelnykova who states that “politicians do not like precise definitions. This leads to the tendency of semantic depersonalisation and opportunistic interpretation of words, adapting them to their own ideology at any cost and by any means, showing contempt for the biography of words, and hence to the culture in general. The scholars consider nominations “democracy”, “people”, “legal state”, “civil relations”, “market reforms”, “European choice” as phantom words, simultaneously forming a separate frame of a game”.

Intent-Analysis as a Research Method

In Ukraine, the first attempts at applying intent-analysis to studying political language began in the late 1980s, with the “Iron Curtain” gradually thinning and allowing access to the works of Western European and North American scholars. Overall, the development of intent-analysis as a psycholinguistic research method aimed at revealing the explicit and implicit mechanisms of communicative interrelationship dates to the 1960s, with the very term “intention” being borrowed by Searle[27] from the works of Brentano[28] and Husserl. At the same time, Ukrainian media researcher Kuznetsova aptly points out that the Russian technique of intent-analysis based on the “field dictionaries of intentions” developed by Russian scholars[29] within the stream of “psycho-semantic intent-analysis” is “cumberson to perform, variable, inaccurate and time consuming”. Thus, the dictionary of intentions designed for political journalism consists of 36 intentions divided into four groups based on the “nature of emotions” to characterise the author-reader’s intentions. Due to the obvious ambiguity of emotional manifestations as presented in political texts, this dictionary, alongside others, Kuznetsova concludes, fails to provide any relevant, verified, and precise characteristics insofar. Another point one should bear in mind when applying intent-analysis to a textual source is that the speaker’s mind maps designed as a result of such research do not refer to any specific database of communicative intentions: it is up to the researcher to discover, define and systematise the intentions captured in the source material.

According to Chudnovskaya,[30] intentional directions of a text can be quite diverse and, in most cases, are more or less authorised, although based on speech schemes and action words, metaphors and other linguistic constructions. As Selivanova argues, “an psychological an intention is qualified as a leading force of human consciousness and thinking that influences the proposed component of inner programme of speech, choices of a style and a way to realise the program by transforming it into a verbal form”. It is quite appropriate to characterise “an intention” in the light of the speech activity motivation concept developed by Vygotsky.[31] According to this theory, “a motive” is an unclear, unconscious desire, a main motivating element of human mental activity that functions as a behavioural regulator. Vygotsky also states that a motive for the speech activity defines its aim – a speaker’s preverbal meaningful intention determining communicative strategies, inner speech programme and the ways it could be accomplished.

In this study, we define “communicative intention” after the Ukrainian linguist Ratsyevch who determines it as “a set of techniques, methods, tactics of communication aimed at achieving a communicative goal”. Ratsyevch believes the strategic result of any particular communication is a communicative act. At any point, the speaker’s intention is aimed at establishing communicative interaction with one or many participants of communication. In the due course of interaction, their communicative intentions are gradually adjusted and corrected, sometimes up to the point of losing any resemblance to the initial intention. A communicative situation’s elements mainly consist of a motive-driven comprehended desire to reach a certain non-verbal effect; a conscious need to conduct adequate verbal actions to reach this intention; and a particular motivation to the verbal action as a trigger to conduct a communicative act.

It is important to keep in mind that even though researchers tend to systematise and typologise communicative intentions, they are, in fact, remarkably diverse and truly individual. The richness and breadth of the so-called map of intentions for any speaker depends on different linguistic and extra linguistic factors. The latter consist of age, a level of education, a societal status. As a result of intent-analysis, a researcher can to a certain extent envision (and consequently visualise in a form of a mind map) the nature of interrelations between a variety of objects within a particular communicative situation. This kind of mental modelling allows us to reveal not only the meaning of a communicative act, but also the speaker’s personality. As Pavlova suggests, this method is grounded into a statement: “whatever is presented in speech is subordinate to a speaker’s interests and modified by them”. That is why we characterise the intent-analysis as a research method that allows reconstructing a speaker’s intentions according to their speech and revealing a hidden subtext otherwise undisclosed by any other kind of analysis.

Therefore, the essence of intent-analysis is to discover the intentional layer of a discourse and the intentional markers in speech. One of the most important limitations to its efficiency arising out of the goal declared is a challenge to reconstruct the speaker’s ‘true’ intentions. Based on the works of intent-analysis
founders Searle\textsuperscript{45} and Austin.\textsuperscript{46} Kufle points out another natural limitation: “a speech act is an intentionally conducted action by a speaker. Although it can be misunderstood (a promise can be interpreted as a threat, and a threat – as a piece of information), it occurs at the request and under the control of the speaker. At the same time, an effect from a speech act is only partly dependent on the speaker and an observer is not always able to distinguish precisely what effect the speaker intended to reach.”\textsuperscript{47} However, if the procedural requirements are fulfilled, intent-analytical research will provide deep and reliable information. To secure objectivity, the procedure requires the optimal number of precedent texts, addresses or speeches conveyed by a person. At least three experts should be involved in reconstructing the supposed impact through the socio-political context into which the texts, addresses or speeches have been merged. The context, in its turn, should be modelled out of events and media reactions to them. By following these requirements to the research procedure, the significance of the results can be granted.

\section*{4 Method}

\textbf{Aim, Objectives and Research Questions}

The aim of this research is to identify a system of ideas about the features of Ukraine’s domestic and foreign policies communicated by Volodymyr Zelensky as the head of state. The objectives are:

\begin{itemize}
  \item a) to determine the prevailing communicative intentions in Zelensky’s key speeches and to recognise the nature of his intentions;
  \item b) to reconstruct effects of social influences (perlocutionary intentions) of the speeches based on their socio-political context, facts, and media reactions to especially eloquent facts and meanings of the speeches;
  \item c) to identify specific tasks that the communicator (Zelensky) hypothetically had by revealing the most dominant statements (illocutionary acts) in his speeches;
  \item d) to mind map the correlation between Zelensky’s intentions and the values he tries to transmit to society as a communicator.
\end{itemize}

The research questions of this study are as follows:

\textbf{RQ1:} What are the most common intentions for influencing or interrelating with the audience that are present in Zelensky’s speeches?

\textbf{RQ2:} What values does Zelensky communicate to the nation in his addresses?

Intent-analysis as a qualitative method of a text analysis used as a main research tool in this study refers to speech acts theory, the theoretical framework of which was set in Austin’s work \textit{How to Do Things with Words}. Austin and Searle actively use two basic terms to define a speech act itself and its effect – \textit{illocution} and \textit{perlocution}. In linguistic pragmatics – a modern field of linguistics, which purposefully studies subjective factors in language, speech and communication as forms of existence of live human language – “illocution” is a “representation of a particular communication intention and communication goal embodied in a statement, which originates within a speech act that gives it a certain specific focus. (...) perlocution is consequences of an illocution’s influence onto a specific recipient – a listener, a viewer, an audience as a whole.”\textsuperscript{48}

Thus, a communicative intention is connected to illocutionary and perlocutionary acts. However, considering an illocution means a speaker mostly realises an intention and controls its realisation in the speech, rather when perlocution means that the effects of an intention’s influence are out of the speaker’s sphere of control. From the point of view of inter- and intrapersonal communication criteria, the influence of intentions laid in illocutionary and perlocutionary acts are directed into the emotions, cognition and actions of the recipients. Taking into consideration the ideas of Glovinskaya\textsuperscript{49} and Apreysian,\textsuperscript{50} Kufle also points out that numerous verbs are used to denote all possible effects of communicative actions. In Slavic languages, including the Ukrainian language, there are significant differences in terms of the type of verb: verbs of the imperfect form (imperfect aspect) denote attempts and processes of influence, and verbs of the perfect form (perfect aspect) name the effects actually achieved. Kufle’s approach to defining and conducting intent-analysis is taken as the methodological background of this study.\textsuperscript{51}

\section*{Analysis Criteria}

The researchers set their goal to define the dominant intentions in Zelensky’s public speeches by counting the frequency of certain intentions occurring in the corresponding texts based on the list of the so-called perlocutionary verbs suggested by Kufle in his seminal book \textit{Aggression and Argumentation}.\textsuperscript{52} The verbs channelling the perlocutionary intentions to the recipient’s cognitive sphere are as follows (Ukrainian translation provided in brackets): to convince (переконувати), to reason with (підбірувати), to draw someone’s attention (відвертати увагу), to disturb someone’s attention (відвертати увагу), to promise (обіцяти), to offer (предлагати), to anger (сердити), to irritate (загортаючи), to frighten (йкнути), to please (приємніштву), to provoke (узвивати), to discourage (забезпеченість відваги), to encourage (піднімання відваги). Verbs like to demoralize (неморалізувати), to stimulate (заохочувати), to tempt (наомлюючи), to deter an action (впливати від чогось), to incite (няктивізувати) belong to the category of perlocutionary verbs intending to prompt a recipient to certain actions.

\section*{Sample and Procedure}

The sample of Zelensky’s speeches selected for analysis consists of 12 speeches delivered by him during 2019 – 2020, starting from the inauguration day on 20\textsuperscript{th} May 2019 (for the full list of speeches, see Table 1). The speeches were analysed in chronological order and encoded with natural numbers from 1 to 12. The titles of the speeches are presented in official translation from Ukrainian to English as they appear on the official website of the President of Ukraine Volodymyr Zelensky.

\begin{table}[h!]
\centering
\begin{tabular}{ |c|c| }
\hline
Code of the speech & Title \tabularnewline \hline
1 & Volodymyr Zelensky’s Inaugural Address \tabularnewline & 20\textsuperscript{th} May 2019 \tabularnewline 2 & Speech by the President of Ukraine during the Independence Day festivities \tabularnewline & 24\textsuperscript{th} August 2019 \tabularnewline 3 & Address by President of Ukraine Volodymyr Zelensky \tabularnewline & 3\textsuperscript{rd} October 2019 \tabularnewline \hline
\end{tabular}
\caption{List of Volodymyr Zelensky’s speeches selected for the intent-analysis}
\end{table}

Three experts analysed the texts and filled out a separate results sheet marked with a letter: 'A' refers to analysis results from expert No. 1, 'B' – from expert No. 2 and 'C' – from expert No. 3. A paragraph of text is taken as a unit of analysis. The experts counted one intention per paragraph even though it could be repeated several times in the same paragraph. Having identified the communicative intentions in each text of the speeches, the scholars independently summed up the results – counted the number of intentions which appeared in each speech, and highlighted the perlocutionary intentions, which predominate in the President’s speeches in general.

It is important to keep in mind the natural limitations the intent-analysis is subject to as a qualitative research method, some of them being successfully eliminated due to a thoroughly prepared research procedure (three experts involved, proper text selection criteria focusing on social importance, potential resonance, and ability to raise debates). To mitigate the risks of failure arising due to the natural variability of emotional words and phrases marking, different language competences, linguistic intuition levels of the experts and subjective feelings of the speaker, the overlapping or identical expert observations have been determined during the final stage of the research.

**Mind Map Construction**

In this research, the communicative intentions are connected to values which the speaker tries to communicate to the audience. Since the axiological dimension (pro-Russian vs pro-European values) has become a matter of constant political debates and manipulations in Ukraine for at least a couple of decades, it is important to distinguish which values the President tries to articulate to the public. To correlate the values, the relations, directions and connections within it. Crowe and Sheppard point out that the mind maps were designed. Kotob et al. suggest mind mapping techniques as a viable and complementary approach for analysing the complex qualitative data collected during a research project. This technique helps sort the qualitative research data collected by category, as well as to visualise the relations, directions and connections within it. Crowe and Sheppard point out that the mind maps “can represent ideas that are linked around a central theme” that is applicable for this study, since the central object of our research is the figure of President Zelensky. The following chapter will present the results of the intent-analysis of the President’s addresses conducted by the authors of this article along with a discussion of the media critical reaction to Zelensky’s speeches published after the addresses had been delivered to the public.

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### 5 Results and Discussion

**Media Reaction to Zelensky’s Addresses: Negative Setback and Critique**

Traditionally, the President’s speeches are not considered an action plan or a perspective development plan for a country. The speeches per se do not contain ready-to-use recipes to solve the burning issues on the state’s agenda. However, they are important texts in terms of setting the nation’s dominant priorities, values and messages. In this context, the President must clearly understand these goals in order to realise ways of achieving them. Advocating for the public good, the political scientists, journalists, and opinion leaders usually keep a close eye on the President’s speeches to distinguish the political vectors of the country.

As far as Zelensky’s speeches are concerned, one of the most curious trends to be distinguished within feedback to them provided by the media is the generally negative attitude towards the Head of the State’s figure. The very first of Zelensky’s public addresses – the inaugural speech – was considered a gloomy forecast for the future of Zelensky’s domestic and foreign policies. The Washington Post called the Ukraine’s choice of President a “weird reality” born out of the nation’s fatigue over the oligarchic rule of Zelensky’s predecessors. Zelensky’s “flexibility” pointed out by the American press bore predominantly negative connotations due to his ability to simultaneously declare pro-Western positions and to express his readiness to engage in dialogue with Russia: “His statement to supporters on being elected: ‘I promise I will never betray you. To Western observers, this statement may seem incredible. Some analysts expect that Zelensky will be forced to choose either Russia or the West, either reform or social protection. Any choice would leave half his supporters feeling betrayed and disillusioned.”

Ukrainian linguist Zahnitko considers Zelensky’s statement as both image-making and people-courting tool: “By appealing to one part of the audience, it neutralises the other (pro-Western vs. pro-Russian supporters).”

Ukrainian experts, in their turn, focus upon the ambiguity of Zelensky’s views expressed in his inaugural speech. For example, Ukrainian Pravda’s reviewers draw attention to the aspects Zelensky preferred to omit – namely, Ukraine’s accession to NATO and the EU that is stipulated in the amendments to the Constitution of Ukraine. The newly elected President “carefully omitted the word Russia as if it had nothing to do with the aggression. Moreover, it sounded as a cease-fire is enough to stop the war.”

Zelensky’s promise to stop the war, one of the most dividing messages he has conveyed so far, was considered largely populist: “Ceasefire at all costs – what does it mean, anyway?” Poroshenko was also ready to take many steps to ceasefire and ended up with war that has lasted for years.

Alongside the inaugural speech, the media response to the President of Ukraine’s declarations comprises official public addresses on various occasions, i.e., Independence Day or New Year. A President’s New Year Address, although exclusively a post-Soviet practice, bears more than merely symbolic significance: as one summarising the results of the expiring year and outlining the priorities for the year to come. All the major mass media unanimously agree that Zelensky’s way of giving the New Year Address is a creative one. “The new President broke the format of the regular New Year’s speeches right down,” media expert Turkova states. “He spoke simple language, appealed to the ordinary people. Right from the start he said he would not walk the way the former politicians used to – i.e., about GDP growing or inflation falling.”

Still, what caused a wave of criticism from Ukraine Elected a Sitcom President. What Can Western Politicians Learn from This Script? Released on 20th May 2019. [online]. [2021-01-19]. Available at: <https://blogs.pravda.com.ua/authors/biletskyj/5ce2b87c7bb22>.

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59 BILETSKY, A.: Promiennist on. Published on 20th May 2019. [online]. [2020-12-12]. Available at: <https://blogs.pravda.com.ua/authors/biletskyj/5ce2b87c7bb22>.

60 TUKAREVA, K.: Komunikačný nevedomý. Chomu novorichná promova Zelenský vylíkala hniezní ukraincov? [Ukraine Elected a Sitcom President. What Can Western Politicians Learn from This Script?] Released on
media experts was a communicative error the President had committed content-wise. Although the narrative of “uniting the nation” is extremely relevant for Ukraine’s current political agenda, the way Zelensky developed it in his speech has distorted his communicative intention beyond recognition. While seemingly wanting to bridge the gaps between the warring factions within the nation, in fact he ended up adding fuel to the flame by calling the dividing issues (decommunization, memory, state language, etc.) of the last six years utterly unimportant. This message of peace was caught by the now-iconic rhetorical question stating Zelensky’s image ever since: “Does it really matter [what language to speak, what heroes to praise], anyway?” No wonder the media experts would mark this speech “an example of how a speech act does not reach a communicative goal. Zelensky’s speech seems to please those it was not meant for. Its target audience gives a message totally different from the expected – and definitely not the one meant to be delivered. This is exactly what matters.”

Zelensky’s clumsy attempt at peace-making resulted in a highly emotional & Does Matter social media flash mob manifesting public resistance to the President’s message. Ukrainian far-right politician Iryna Farion, known for her rather straightforward judgements, called the Presidential New Year Address “a manifesto of a greedy Sovok,” stupid arrogance and disgusting defeat” expressed “so voluminously, almost holographically. Lack of ideals, principles, goals and depth of life of each and every person in this world.” An equally emotional response was given by the journalist Drozdov who expressed the position of the outraged Zelenskyy-na-den-nezalezhnosti-vierkoyu-serdyuchkoyu-pratsyuv>. November 2019. [online]. [2021-01-19]. Available at: <https://detector.media/infospace/article/179981/2020-08-26-yak-prezident-ukrayini-pid-chas-urochistostej-z-nagodi-dn23>

The President’s ‘Soviet’, presumably non-democratic mindset alongside the disturbing ambiguity of his views on Russia expressed, in particular, in his Independence Day 2020 speech have been subject to heavy criticism on the part of opinion leaders and the media pool. Bakhteev considers the words and images used by Zelensky (“Ukraine-the-mom,” “mother-Ukraine,” “Ukrainians-the-children,” etc.) a marker of so-called unconscious totalitarianism, a psychological condition of a person who might consider themselves a democrat, “but as soon as politically irrelevant issues, i.e., human relations, are concerned, such people would subconsciously think in terms of totalitarianism.”

Another telling detail drawing experts’ attention is Zelensky’s constant attempts to throw shade at his opponents and predecessors. What was logical and justified in the inaugural speech looks more of “biting political attacks” and “blatant power play” a year after the election. Despite the numerous expressions of gratitude Zelensky conveys to the military, the volunteers and the medical staff, his baths and constant factual and logical fallacies make the whole speech sound insincere. The following section presents the experts’ assessment on how the President’s communicative intentions correlate with values he set into public sphere of Ukraine.

**Expert Assessment of Zelensky’s Speeches**

Three experts analysed the communicative intentions of Zelensky’s speeches individually and independently based on their own Ukrainian language competence, linguistic intuition and psychological and emotional attitude towards the images, tropes and rhetorical devices presented in the texts. The experts examined verbs as lexical units exposing communicative intentions most obviously within the direct verbal context, i.e., through their ties with the neighbouring lexical units, through the meaning (direct or figurative) they acquire, with specific attention paid to idioms, informal (slang) vocabulary and foreign borrowings (including those from Russian). This way, the experts were able to define specific phrases they believed were hard to correlate with certain communicative intentions or had their impact determined predominantly contextually or non-verbally (i.e., by the speaker’s intonation) – such as ironic, sarcastic or humorous statements, aggressive persuasion figures etc. The results were summed up in Table 2 showing the differences and similarities in each expert’s inferences and the total number of intentions identified.

The results submitted by expert No. 1 (Table 2, column A) prove that, among the intentions influencing the recipient’s cognition, the intention to convince is the one most frequently applied by Zelensky (n=42), with the intention to draw attention following straight after (n=32). Among the intentions directed on the emotional sphere, the intentions to promise (n=25) and to calm down (n=19) are the most used, while the intentions to encourage (n=11), to please (n=10) and to frighten (n=8), although emotionally strong and expressive, are not precisely articulated. Among the intentions prompting the target audience to certain actions, the communicative intention to stimulate is implied most often (n=23).

As for the other four imperative intentions taken into account, they prove to be considerably underrepresented. Not even once did the speaker intend to deter an action from the audience. The intentions to tempe and to invite have been captured once and three times respectively, i.e., in Zelensky’s inaugural speech: “Do it. And take all the medals for it. Earn good points for the early parliamentary elections.”

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The communicative intentions aimed to influence the recipients' emotions, expert No. 3 points out to encourage (n=44), to please (n=34), to reason with (n=34) as the most frequent ones, with the intentions to promise (n=16), to irritate (n=13), to comfort someone (n=12) captured almost half as much. The communicative intention to irritate appears in Zelensky's statements done in Russian.

It is important to note that the President tends to change the language of his addresses from Ukrainian into Russian as he approaches the residents of temporarily occupied territories of Crimea, Donetsk and Luhans regions. This way, he differentiates himself from the former President Petro Poroshenko who made language issue a key point in his electoral campaign, positioning Ukrainian language as a means for unifying all Ukraine's ethnic groups in one political nation. Zelensky, on the contrary, was known for delivering his speeches into Russian as he approaches the residents of temporarily occupied territories of Crimea, Donetsk and Luhans regions. Among the communicative intentions aimed at prompting the audience to certain conduct and actions, the intention to stimulate (n=56) was picked out by expert No. 3 as the most frequent, followed by the intentions to promise (n=34), to reason with (n=34), to calm down (n=34) as the most frequent ones, with the intentions to promise (n=16), to irritate (n=13), to comfort someone (n=12) captured almost half as much. The communicative intention to irritate appears in Zelensky's statements done in Russian.

We wait until he finishes his tale to finally move on to champagne, sandwiches and salads. Today it will be


To form a balanced and clear view on the quantity and quality of the speaker’s communicative intentions as defined through the intent analysis procedure, the feedback acquired from the experts was examined for possible similarities and overlapping. It is presumed that, to find the results verified and significant, at least two out of three expert opinions must correlate. As for the present study, the experts agreed that, in terms of cognitive intentions, the President primarily intends to convince the audience (n=4–1 expert No. 1 and n=4–8 expert No. 2), to draw attention (n=32– expert No. 1 and n=24 – expert No. 2), to reason (n=10 – expert No. 1 and n=8 – expert No. 2), to distract attention (n=1 – expert No. 3 and n=2 – expert No. 1). In terms of emotion-directed intentions, the intentions to encourage (n=45 – expert No. 2 and n=44 – expert No. 3), to calm down (n=19 – expert No. 1 and n=16 – expert No. 2), to please (n=10 for both experts No. 1 and No. 2), to frighten (n=8 for both experts No. 1 and No. 3), to discourage (n=7 for both experts No. 2 and No. 3) are the most frequent. The smallest rate of similarities was detected in the list of communicative intentions used to prompt the audience to particular behaviour. The only example is the intention to demoralise recorded by expert No. 2 (n=8) and expert No. 3 (n=6).

Values Communicated by the President

Following the Revolution of Dignity (November 2013 – February 2014), Ukrainian society has finally agreed upon the European vector of its development in political, economic and cultural spheres. In 2017, Gorshenin-Institute and the Regional Office of the Friedrich Ebert Fund in Ukraine and Belarus held the large-scale sociological research “Ukrainian Society and European Values” that proved that “Ukraine’s Revolution of Dignity led to a pro-European government. In this context, Europe is viewed not only as a geographic area, but above all as a value space. Both supporters of Ukraine’s European integration and many of its opponents believe that European values serve as a foundation for a successful society.”

Among the values most closely associated with the European mindset and actively supported, the Ukrainian respondents (Euro-sceptics as well as Euro-enthusiasts) named peace, respect for human life, human rights, individual freedom, self-realisation, solidarity (support for others), democracy, equality, rule of law, freedom of religion, tolerance, and respect for other cultures. As far as the regional dimension of the Gorshenin survey concerned, Eastern Ukraine’s representatives tend to express more paternalistic views on the values, believing the state should provide, even ‘install’ them into society. In general, European values seem to have been much less clearly articulated and mentioned in the Eastern Ukrainian social and cultural space as compared to the Western Ukrainian one.

The paternalistic predisposition of the East, alongside such factors as regional industry and labour market structure (giant plants and factories promoting collectivistic labour culture and diminishing individual responsibility), leads to a nostalgic ressentiment over the lost ‘well-being’ attributed to Soviet times.

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6 Conclusion

The intent-analysis performed by three independent experts revealed the prevalence of cognitive and emotional intentions in the speeches by the President of Ukraine Volodymyr Zelensky. Overall, his addresses feature short and simple syntactic constructions and are full of colloquialisms, emotional and expressively marked vocabulary. Another important feature bearing distinct conceptualising functions is Zelensky’s usage of Russian while addressing Russian-speaking citizens of Ukraine, including those from temporarily occupied regions. One of the most outstanding tendencies observed throughout the whole range of Zelensky’s public speeches is his intention to capitalise public sentiment, to demonstrate his being on equal ground with his audience, to contrast himself to his predecessors, the elder generation of politicians, as well as to oversimplify and even vulgarise the complex and multifaceted messages and ideas up to the point they come home to most of the audience.
The discourse analysis of the media response to Zelensky’s statements proves that, while seemingly effective when addressed to the broad public, his communicative strategies tend to fail when scrutinised by media experts (thus partially explaining his reluctance to convey his actual views directly). By stringing Zelensky’s most resonant messages out of their emotional and theatrical wrapping, journalists, media scholars and opinion leaders expose their incogruity and logical fallacies content-wise, attributing Zelensky’s innovative presentation strategies to his lack of political experience, his immature public stance and the disturbing ambiguity of his worldview partly caused by his recent affiliation with show business.

It is important to stress that the authors of this study are aware of the limitations of the qualitative research methods used. We intentionally did not try to paralinguistic means used in the selected sample of Volodymyr Zelensky’s speeches and neglected Zelensky’s specific manner of speaking. The possible results of such analysis would enrich the spectrum of interpretations of the President of Ukraine’s figure as a communicator and a politician. Prospectively, defined in this study, the characteristics of Zelensky as a linguistic personality can be objects of content analysis or other types of quantitative and qualitative research.

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BIBLIOGRAPHY: